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Abstract

The purpose of this Honors project is to provide insights into the current condition of Kosovo’s
vetting system, highlight its major drawbacks, and provide recommendations on how to
overcome them. This paper discloses that the vetting system, despite being recently established,
remains greatly challenged by political implications and the clannish and/or individual decisions
to issue or deny security clearances for civil servants, intelligence and police personnel. The
study emphasizes that an oversight in the development of the vetting process may come
associated with political and material costs, thus, putting the integrity and objectivity of the
whole security system in question. This study uses a mixed-method approach that relies on both
primary and secondary data, namely desk research, literature review, small-scale surveys and
semi-structured interviews.
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I.

Introduction
i.

Statement of the Problem
Kosovo, as a post-war country, represents a sensitive case due to its numerous

complexities in relation to the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The transitional phase of the
country began in 1999 with the termination of ongoing conflicts, and the period immediately
after the hostilities was devoted to peace and recovery. Different from the security sectors of
Western Balkan countries, Kosovo’s security sector has not undergone any reforms, in contrast,
it has been newly constructed with the help and supervision of the international community1.
During the UNMIK presence in Kosovo, there were two primary security institutions, namely the
Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)2. Whereas, the period after
the country’s independence in 2008 involves a new security architecture designed according to
the Ahtisaari proposal.
Up to date, among the vital criteria for Kosovo’s path towards the European Union
Integration is the governance and democratic oversight of the security sector3. The key
measurement instrument of Kosovo’s progression towards meeting the EU requirements is the
European Union Annual Progress Report4. This report has continually shown over the years that
the overall performance of Kosovo’s security sector has been hindered mainly by the
development of the security clearance system, highlighting the system’s key role in the security
sector. The report has repeatedly identified the security clearance system in Kosovo among the
most concerning dimensions. The concerns were furthermore confirmed as the public discourse
dilemmas vigorously increased, indicating possible misuse of the system for numerous purposes.

1

(CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOSVETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019.
2
Ibid.
3
EU Commission. “Progress Report on Kosovo” (2018). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-kosovo-report.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
4
Ibid.
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In post-conflict countries, Transitional Justice (TJ) measures are perceived to have a large
impact in state-building and democratization processes5. During the last few years, these
measures have become a major topic of academic debates across countries, suggesting that they
cannot be self-sufficient in lack of an environment that supports an inclusive understanding of
transitional justice. TJ measures do, however, yield successful results in countries where
government transparency, political accountability, healthy security and economic sectors exist6.
This scenario remains far from reality in Kosovo as many of these measures are yet to be
attained. In the security sector, more specifically, vetting, a fundamental procedure in the
security field, is tied to concepts such as political corruption and clientelism, hampering the
civilian oversight. The institution that accommodates the vetting authority, the Kosovo
Intelligence Agency (KIA) is linked with numerous scandals made public by the media,
increasing furthermore the perception of an inadequate security clearance system.
The security clearance can be identified as a somewhat new process in Kosovo as it
emerged simultaneously with the establishment of the security institutions7. More precisely, the
final completion of the legal framework on the security sector occurred in parallel with the 2008
adoption of the Law on Classified Information and Security Clearance regulating the vetting
system. (KFOS)8.
Security Clearance is granted to a person allowing them access to classified documents or
confidential areas after having undergone a background check through security vetting9. Four
types of security clearances for national security positions exist, namely Restricted, Confidential,
Secret, and Top secret (TS)10. Security Vetting can be defined as an evaluation method which
5

(CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOSVETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
9
(KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-SecuritySector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
10
US Department of State (2019). “All about security clearances”.
https://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/c10978.htm. Web. 25 Jan. 2019.
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confirms whether an individual is a possible risk to the state and its public order. In the scenario
where security clearance is granted to individuals who are considered to poses risk or threat, they
automatically become dangerous not only to the security sector, but also to Kosovo’s interests.
Hence, the security vetting system plays a fundamental role in the security sector. Yet, there is
ample room for misuse of the security vetting procedure either for personal gain or elimination
of political opponents11.
An oversight in the development of the vetting procedure may come associated with
detrimental costs (both material and political), questioning the objectivity and the integrity of the
whole security system. Consequently, the possibility that the process may furthermore be
misused by the officials to fulfill other personal or political preferences (e.g. to bring inadequate
individuals into the security sector) must not be overseen12. Hence, to ensure an adequate
procedure, it is of immense importance that the individuals that manage the vetting process are
professionally qualified officials with high moral integrity.
Having pinpointed security vetting as a procedure which requires immediate attention for
the betterment of the security sector in Kosovo, this project provides a detailed overview on the
current situation of Kosovo’s vetting system and its major drawbacks by analyzing current and
past practices that are detrimental to the vetting system, namely, Transitional Justice and
Security Sector Reform. Furthermore, this document aims to provide helpful insights into the
context of security clearances, as well as the up to date performance of the vetting procedure in
the Kosovo’s security sector. Using a mixed-method approach that relies on both primary and
secondary data, namely desk research, literature review, small-scale surveys and in-depth semistructured interviews, this analysis will be qualitative in nature.

11

(KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Available at
http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2019.
12
Ibid.
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II.

Literature Review
i.

Security Sector in Kosovo
Kosovo’s security sector is comprised of various institutions and mechanisms. Their

powers and competencies are set forth in the country’s constitution and supported by regulations
and laws. The government (Prime minister and other ministries), the President, the Parliament,
the Kosovo Security Council, Kosovo Police, Kosovo Security Force, and the Kosovo
Intelligence Agency make up the most important bodies and mechanisms of the country13.

Figure 1. Organization of the Security Sector14
However, not all of the abovementioned security institutions have the power to use force or
retain an executive mandate. Currently, among other local security institutions, Kosovo Police is
the only body that is empowered to use any physical force, thus, being the most important
13

(DCAF) Center for Security, Development, and the Rule of Law (2012). “Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in
the Western Balkans”. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces. Baka, Bogdanovski, et al. Available at http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/almanac.pdf
14
Ibid.
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security institution of the country15. Whereas, the intelligence sector, represented by the Kosovo
Intelligence Agency, represents the last phase of a country’s security sector reform and
democratization processes. The rule of law and democratic governance, as demonstrated in many
established democracies, are known to reach the intelligence sector only after having been well
established in other areas of one state16.

Figure 2. Mapping of the Security Sector in Kosovo17
15

Ibid.
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
16
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ii.

Context of Security Vetting and its Purpose
Vetting is the investigation process of personnel in state institutions, businesses, and any

other positions which have access to confidential data18. The purpose of vetting is to confirm
whether an individual is of integrity to execute a sensitive activity. One’s obedience to the laws
and the state constitution can be measured through the integrity and trustworthiness of the
individual19. Those who have had a dubious past e.g. engagement in organized crime, terrorist
activities, or corruption, will not pass the vetting test and therefore, will fail to fulfill the position
at stake. Positions which require screening of personnel are found in the security institutions (e.g.
police, military, or intelligence agencies), in the executive branch, and Non-Governmental
Organizations responsible for dealing with sensitive data20. The vetting system differs across
states, ranging from a centralized model in which only one chief agency is in charge of
conducting vetting for all the other institutions, to a decentralized model in which each body has
its own vetting units where private contractors carry out the vetting process21. Even though the
techniques used in a vetting process differ from one country’s model to another, common
procedures include standard forms to be filled which require the input of personal information,
face to face interviews, electronic checks that reveal financial, criminal, and medical records, and
reference confirmation22.
Despite the critical role vetting plays in ensuring trustworthiness and integrity of an
individual to conduct important activities and positions, the procedure also serves as a
transformative tool of the institutional setting in post-war countries23. As such, an adequate
vetting system would be able to transform the institutions that have failed to develop and
maintain trust with their citizens in the past. In light of these facts, vetting does not only

18

(CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOSVETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
DCAF 2006a: Vetting and the Security Sector, DCAF Backgrounder
22
Ibid.
23
EU Commission. “Progress Report on Kosovo” (2018). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-kosovo-report.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
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contribute towards legitimacy of the public institutions, but it does provide larger implications
for the government reform. However, under the scenario of a flawed vetting system, which is
often present in post-conflict countries that lack strong policy and legal frameworks, wellfunctioning institutions, or economic stability, the vetting procedure will not be able to positively
contribute to government reform and institutional trust24.Nevertheless, the possibility that the
vetting system may become a victim of corruption and misconduct must not be excluded.
A study conducted by the Center for Research, Documentation and Publication in
Kosovo shows that there are two main issues when introducing a vetting procedure in post-war
countries, namely employment restrictions (e.g. lack of qualified staff) and post-vetting
reintegration25. Keeping in mind that qualified personnel is very hard to find in post-conflict
countries, the vetting system must not be introduced immediately but rather gradually to ensure
that institutions are adequately staffed26. Furthermore, the process must ensure reintegration of
the staff that has been hired prior to the conflict, even for those who have failed to become part
of the personnel of the newly established order27.
As previously mentioned, vetting involves oversight of security institutions including the
intelligence agencies28. This process is usually done by the judiciary, the Members of the
Assembly, or other responsible public units which are to collect data, communicate them with
the intelligence agency, and together come up with conclusions and recommendations29.
However, in Kosovo’s case, vetting is the responsibility of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency
itself.

24

(CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOSVETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
US Department of State (2019). “All about security clearances”.
https://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/c10978.htm. Web. 25 Jan. 2019.
29
Ibid.
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iii.

Security Vetting in Kosovo
Introduced by the international community, the vetting system in Kosovo is based on

two laws: Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and Security Clearances
and Law No. 03/L-063 2008 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency30. The purpose of the first law is
to establish an inclusive system for classifying data related to Kosovo’s security and for the
security clearances that are issued to individuals who have access to it. The law is composed of
eight chapters, namely the general provisions, classification of information, personnel security,
files and data protection, industrial security, administration of the classification and security
clearance system, and the final provisions. Its articles mainly focus on the purpose and scope of
security vetting, the classifying information criteria, classification levels, and the process of
establishing a vetting authority. The law also highlights that classified information must involve
issues of foreign relations, state security, intelligence activities , or any other information that
concerns Kosovo’s security interests.
Under the Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and Security
Clearances, information can be classified in four different levels: “top secret”, “secret”,
“confidential”, and “restricted”31. Top secret information, being the highest level of
classification, can only be granted to the following actors: “the President of Kosovo, the
President of the Assembly of Kosovo, the Prime Minister; the Chair of the Kosovo Security
Council, the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Director General of the Kosovo
Police (KP), and the Commander of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF)”.32 Meanwhile, “Secret”,
“Confidential” and “Restricted” original classification authority may be exercised only by

30

Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
31
Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
32
Katy A. Crossley-Frolick & Oya Dursun-Ozkanca (2012). “Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in
Kosovo: Comparing the Kosovo Security Force and Police Reform Processes, Journal of Intervention and State
building”, 6:2, 121-143, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2012.655595
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Permanent Secretaries, Chief Executive Officers or Executive Directors of public authorities and
other equivalent senior positions33.
Under Article 24 of this law, the vetting authority belongs to the Kosovo Intelligence Agency
responsible for issuing security clearance. In order to obtain security clearance, the request must
be sent by the public institution that seeks the issue for their employees34.
To oversee the activities of KIA and ensure a lawful vetting procedure, a special unit has
been established under the name of Parliamentary Oversight Committee (POC)35. The mandate
of the POC is highlighted under Chapter VIII of the Law No. 03/L-063 2008 on the Kosovo
Intelligence Agency, whose main responsibilities include: (i) overseeing the activities of KIA
and ensuring legality of these processes; (ii) reviewing Prime Minister’s reports regarding the
issue at stake; (iii) reviewing KIA Director’s reports regarding the expenses and activities
performed by the intelligence institution; (iv) reviewing reports sent by the Inspector General;
(v) reviewing KIA’s budget proposal and providing feedback opinion; and (vi) conducting
investigations regarding the operations, responsibilities, and employee behaviors of the KIA.36 A
better understanding of the vetting system based on Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the
Classification of Information and Security Clearances in Kosovo can be provided through the
organigram published by the Centre for Research, Development and Publications in 201537.

33

Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Kosovo Intelligence Agency. “The Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency” (2010). Available at http://akirks.org/HTML_ENG/2008_03-L063_en.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
37
Ibid,
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Figure 3. Overview of the vetting system based on Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and
Security Clearances in Kosovo

kosovo.rit.edu

Page 17 of 61

RIT Kosovo (A.U.K)
Germia Campus Nazim Gafurri, 21 Dr. Shpëtim Robaj,
Prishtinë 10000, Republic of Kosovo

iv.

The Process of Security Clearance in Kosovo
Given the fact that the process of security clearance has emerged at the same time with

the establishment of the security institutions, it can be said that this process is a novel one for
Kosovo. Indeed, the completion of the legal framework on the security sector happened around
the same time as the Law on Classified Information and Security Clearance was adopted- the
Law regulating the vetting system in Kosovo38. Therefore, the law drafting process of the vetting
system in Kosovo was sponsored by the government and was initiated during 2008 while most of
the security institutions in Kosovo were newly established e.g. the Kosovo Intelligence Agency
(KIA), and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The law was drafted by a team composed of
national and international experts who were engaged in examining models of security clearance
applied by other countries while striving to match these already introduced practices to Kosovo’s
context.
The main issue that emerged during the process of law-drafting was to determine in
which of the proposed institutions the central authority for implementation of the law is to be
positioned. The team of experts came up with the decision that the vetting authority would have
to be situated at the newly established institution, namely the Kosovo Intelligence Agency
(KIA), under the assumption that the other already operating security institutions are
politicized39. The law was proposed in 2010 to the Kosovo Assembly and was adopted during the
same year. The law highlighted the fact that the Department for Security Clearance- the authority
in charge of vetting, even though being structurally part of the KIA, would be autonomous from
the other departments and the Director of KIA40. However, since its establishment in 2010, the
Department for Security Clearance started misusing its authority41. While being part of the
structure of KIA, the department soon began acting the same way as the other units of the
agency, thus becoming completely non- transparent to the public42.

38

(KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Available at
http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2019.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
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In this respect, in 2013, media reported potential unlawful actions of the Department for
Security Clearance, where people were granted non-merit-based security clearance certificates
on the basis of personal or group interest43. These practices raised concerns not only among
officials but also among public opinion regarding the professionalism of the vetting authority.
That the Department was facing serious problems became further apparent by the beginning of
2014, when the Kosovo Police arrested one of the Departments’ senior officers for fraud under
the suspicion that the individual had allegedly falsified secondary school diploma44. This event
furthermore contributed towards weakening of the credibility of the vetting system in Kosovo.
In order to avoid the occurrence of such cases, the role of the Department for Security
Vetting within the KIA has been defined exclusively to prevent the security system from any
personal, political, or administrative influence. As such, the legislators have purposely regulated
the role of the Department for Security Vetting, giving it the right to act as an administrative unit
with legal functional autonomy. 45 The head of a public institution is to send a written request
with a specific classification level (confidential, secret, or top secret) to the head of the
Department for Security Vetting. The whole idea of the lawmakers was to disengage the Director
of the KIA from the process entirely, hoping that a minimal involvement of the director would
minimize any possible outside influence.
While the intention of legislators was to separate the activity of the Department for
Security Vetting from that of KIA, the law specifies that only KIA is the responsible authority
for conducting security vetting. Hence, indicating that the Department for Security Vetting is
only one of the other units within the KIA. As such, this department would have to function
under the Law on the KIA and the other internal KIA regulations. While the aim of the
lawmakers was to authorize KIA as the main authority for conducting Security vetting, by
simultaneously giving power to the Department for Security Vetting, the law failed to properly
function in practice. Due to conceptual ambiguity, the Vetting procedure remains far from
perfect, thus, it should either be KIA who conducts the security vetting or another institution,

43

Ibid.
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
44
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independent from KIA. It is not appropriate to ask KIA to be the vetting authority while
simultaneously asking it not to fulfill these duties. A process as such, not only weakens the
functioning of the security vetting, but it also further complicates the role of the Department for
Security Vetting inside the KIA.
A person is issued a Security Certificate by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency only after
having passed the Security Vetting procedure. As the law points out, the person issued a security
certificate must be perceived an acceptable security risk46. The security clearance will
automatically be denied if a person is considered an unacceptable risk. An individual that poses
unacceptable risk is one who:
 Is disloyal to the Republic of Kosovo, its Constitution and its laws and orders
 Can easily be influenced, manipulated, or blackmailed to help an individual, a certain
group, an institution, or a foreign government whose intentions are to act against the
security interests of the Republic of Kosovo
 Perform actions that show signs of mental, personality, or emotional disorder, lack of
self-control, lack of judgement, lack of will to obey orders, insincerity, and any other
behaviors that raise suspicion regarding his/her condition, loyalty, and the capability to
not disclose any classified information47
After having conducted the Security Vetting Procedure and an individual has proven to be an
unacceptable risk for the security sector of the Republic of Kosovo, the KIA must continue
monitoring the individual in general while also evaluating the information about his/her
behaviors based on the following factors:
 The nature of the behavior
 The conditions that follow that specific behavior
 The latest occurrence of the behavior and its frequency

46

Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
47
Ibid.
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 The current age and maturity level of the individual during the performance of the
behavior
 The extent to which his/her will contributed to such behavior
 The motive behind the behavior
 Potential for being used, forced, pressured, or threatened
 Likelihood for repetition of such behavior 48
Having identified the abovementioned criteria, it becomes apparent that the Security
Vetting procedure is a very complicated and sensitive process. The purpose of the process must
be to come up with a thorough evaluation of an individual, and the importance of the procedure
appears fully only when the evaluation deems a person as an unacceptable risk for the Republic
of Kosovo. Being denied the security clearance or being forced to move out of a current job
position is not as equally important as the official qualification of a person as a non- acceptable
risk for the country. A qualification as such is very harsh, and it encompasses moral
consequences which are beyond worse than just a simple denial of a security clearance
certificate. In order to qualify a person as disloyal to the Republic of Kosovo, the evaluation
method must be based on facts and unbiased judgement. If the Security Vetting Procedure proves
categorizes a person an unacceptable risk, the latter has the right to contest the decision49. Under
this scenario, to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of privacy of that person, a
hearing procedure might be carried out. However, under certain cases e.g. when the security or
political interests of the Republic of Kosovo might be threatened or challenged, the hearing
procedure might not be held at all.
Practically, most of the intelligence agencies use the justification that the hearing
procedure might be in contradiction with the protection of secret and public interest, hence,
completely avoiding the hearing procedure. While this justification might sound right, neglecting
a hearing procedure by the intelligence agency raises questions about the objectivity of this
decision and the possibility of misuse of the argument. Having highlighted this fact, then the

48

(KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Available at
http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2019.
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judicial protection comes into question, considering that hearing the party is a fundamental
human right, the judicial must be capable of revising the decision of the agency in charge that
has denied the right to hearing of an individual. However, the scenario of a weak judicial
protection indicates potential for misuse of the power by the intelligence agency. In other words,
weak judicial protection gives executive power to the intelligence agency who may use the
argument of protecting state secret and public interest to violate the rights of an individual. After
the Security Vetting Procedure deemed a person as an unacceptable security risk, the person will
be receiving a written decision that he/she has been denied the security clearance certificate50. If
the individual wants to appeal this decision, he/she can do so within fifteen (15) days upon
receipt of the written decision. The appeal used to be submitted to the Inspector General of the
Kosovo Intelligence Agency, however, the procedure has now changed according to the
Government Regulation no. 37/ 201251. Following the new procedure, the appeal is now
addressed to the Director of the KIA, whereas the decision for denying the security clearance of
an individual is taken by the Security Vetting Department52. The purpose behind this change was
to avoid any inconveniences since the inspector general of the KIA is not a body of the second
grade, hereby, not suitable to report to the Prime Minister and the President of the State. If the
general was to report, then their rank with the director of the KIA would be the same.53 However,
even the new regulation still raises dilemmas (both political and judicial) considering the fact
that the Security Vetting process is not only conducted for the KIA officials but also for other
significant institutions such as the Kosovo Police, the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, the
Ministry of Justice, etc54. Regardless of the fact that the officials of the aforementioned
institutions might be refused by the Inspector General or the Director of the KIA, the refusal
would still come from the same institution, the KIA.

50

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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v.

Main Challenges of the Security Clearance in Kosovo
Under the Law on Classified Information and Security Clearance, the Kosovo

Intelligence Agency is responsible for both vetting for access to sensitive data and the vetting
conducted for recruiting security employees in other public institutions55. That means that the
Kosovo Intelligence Agency is mandated to conduct vetting for the other horizontally equal
security institutions such as the Kosovo Police, or the Armed Forces56. Consequently, the first
challenge facing the security vetting in Kosovo has to do with the dominant authority of the KIA
over the other security institutions. The issue has been raised when the Intelligence Agency
became responsible for conducting vetting for the recruitment level of the other public
institutions, becoming a far advanced and higher authority institution compared to other security
units57. Not only does this procedure make KIA a dominant authority towards other security
institutions, but also towards the Kosovo Assembly.
According to the aforementioned law, only the President, the Prime Minister, and the
Chair of the Assembly have access to all the levels of sensitive information, meaning that, the
Members of the Parliament of the Kosovo Assembly are not exempted from the vetting
procedure conducted by the KIA58. In other words, this responsibility makes KIA an executive
body with authoritative position towards the MPs of the Kosovo Assembly, excluding the
President of the Assembly. That is, in order to have access to classified information, all the MPs
of the Kosovo Assembly must be issued security clearance by the KIA. This issue has received
special attention prior to May 2014 when the KIA provided no security clearance to the MPs of
the oversight committee who were responsible to specifically oversee the activities and overall
performance of the KIA. This procedure, where a legislative body requests security clearance by
an executive body was not initiated at all by the person in charge, the President of the Assembly,
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Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
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(KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-SecuritySector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019
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who did not make the request under the assumption that such a procedure is not logical. Since the
Kosovo Assembly MPs did not have access to classified information, the overall performance
and efficiency of the Kosovo Assembly was impacted. A procedure as such which involved
vetting of the overseers by the KIA, has generated dissatisfaction which then led to conflict of
interest among the public institutions.
Apart from the highlighted challenges facing the security system in Kosovo, another
particularly concerning issue appears to be the existing appeal system. Under the Law of the
Kosovo Intelligence Agency Nr.37/2012, individuals who undergo the vetting process and fail to
pass the security clearance have the right to appeal59. The right to appeal is based on the internal
regulation of KIA responsible for regulating the complaint procedures of all the individuals who
complain on the decision of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. The first step is to direct the
complaint to the Inspector General of KIA, who is responsible for responding within a timeframe
of 30 days. In case of a failed attempt, where the Inspector General rejects the complaint, the last
step involves the Basic Court.
The members of the Kosovo Police (KP) and the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCP) has
undergone the process of security vetting by the KIA during the years 2013-2014. Resultantly, a
large number of these members, including senior officials failed to pass the security clearance
process. The number of officials that were rejected the security clearance certificate was more
than 50, all of whom made complaints regarding the vetting process conducted by KIA. The
current appeal system is faced with two significant challenges: (1) the individuals rejected the
security clearance certificate are instructed to submit their complaints within the KIA
(supposedly the complaints should be submitted at another independent authority), and (2) the
last means to bring the case of security clearance denial to court has become troublesome for the
judiciary since none of aforementioned cases has followed the existing appeal cycle60.
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Kosovo Intelligence Agency. “The Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency” (2010). Available at http://akirks.org/HTML_ENG/2008_03-L063_en.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
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(KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-SecuritySector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019
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vi.

Supervision of Legality
An institution is supervised both legally and politically. At the political level, the KIA is

supervised by the Parliamentary Committee on the Supervision of the Kosovo Intelligence
Agency61. However, the mere fact that the Members of the Committee on Supervision of the
KIA lack the security clearance, has hugely impacted the democratic control and the mandate of
supervision of the KIA62. The Security Vetting Process has not been initiated for the Members of
the Parliamentary Committee because the Assembly of Kosovo has never filed a request to the
KIA for initiating the process. This, for the sole reason that the Committee itself performs under
the KIA. Several international organizations together with the Assembly of Kosovo has brought
to light the issue that the executive branch cannot exercise the security vetting authority for the
legislative branch. Assembly of Kosovo argued that the vetting process of the Members of the
Parliament will not be unbiased and/or objective. However, the reason why the members of the
Committee on the Supervision of the KIA still do not have Security Clearance is due to the
conflict of interest between the KIA that is responsible for conducting the vetting and the MPs
who would supervise it63.
All these inconsistencies diminish the credibility of the vetting process, thus, pointing to
the idea that the executive branch can indeed influence the legislative branch through the security
vetting procedure. One way of influencing could be manifested through the denial of security
clearance, where one would discriminate between the MPs who are “wanted” and those who are
“unwanted” to have access to classified data64. The vetting procedure of MPs requires the
executive branch, more specifically the KIA, to create a database consisting of files on MPs,
their past, their families, their wealth, social ties, etc65. The access to such data furthermore
leaves room for misusage of the process by the executive branch.
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(KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Robert
Muharremi. Available at http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan.
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DCAF 2006b: Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services, DCAF Backgrounder
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KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Robert
Muharremi. Available at http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan.2019.
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A considerable number of complaints who have not passed the vetting procedure of the
KIA has been received by the Committee on the Supervision of the Kosovo Intelligence
Agency66. The cases of the individuals who have failed the vetting process were investigated by
the officials of KIA and the Committee, cooperatively67. Despite the fact that several MPs were
not issued security clearances, the KIA granted the members of the MP and the members of the
Committees on Supervision of KIA access to classified data of the individuals wo have failed to
pass the vetting procedure68. A large number of appeals mainly coming from the Kosovo Police
was received by the Committee on the Supervision of the KIA. Most of the individuals who were
denied the security clearances belonged to the “Confidential” level of classified information69.
The aforementioned facts draw attention to three significant problems regarding the
supervision of legality. The first one being that the Parliamentary Committee was engaged in the
process of reviewing the complaints of individuals who have been denied their security
clearances when the Committee has no legal authorization whatsoever. In fact, the appeals
process is regulated by the regulation 37/012 after which procedure the complaining party can
directly address the issue to court.
The second problem concerns the role of the Judicial Branch on the overall procedure of
the security vetting. Up to date, the security vetting procedure has not been conducted on judges
yet, a scenario which contradicts with the rule that the judges who deal with appeals against KIA
are supposed to have passed the whole vetting procedure successfully themselves. The judges
justify their actions by hiding behind the argument that the Executive branch has no power over
the judicial branch, that is, KIA does not have authority to conduct the vetting of the judges.
Nevertheless, a rule as such has never been stated anywhere in the Law on the Classification of
Information and Security Vetting, factually, paragraph No.2 of the Article 22, highlights that
only the President, the Prime Minister, and the Assembly of Kosovo Speaker are excluded from
66

(KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-SecuritySector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019.
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(CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for
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the vetting procedure70. This activity of the judicial branch leaves room for a lot of
misinterpretation such as the idea that the judges are not given access to sensitive data so that
they cannot impede the court decisions against the KIA either. In addition, the independency of
the Judicial Branch under this scenario also denies the right of the aggravated party to have legal
protection, a case which does not align with the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.
Last, there are problems concerning the implementation of decisions by the KIA, more
specifically, decisions of the KIA that have not been implemented by the Kosovo Police
regarding the refusal of security clearances of numerous Kosovo Police Members. That there is
lack of cooperation between the KIA and the Kosovo Police became furthermore apparent by the
act that the Kosovo Police did not implement the decision of the KIA without getting approval to
do so by the final court71. This act of the Kosovo Police puts the objectivity of the KIA
furthermore in question.
Having introduced significant processes of the vetting system in Kosovo, this section is
finalized by briefly presenting the draft law on Protection of Classified Information which was
drafted especially for the purpose of overcoming the current obstacles facing the system. The
importance of this draft law will become apparent especially in the results section of this
research paper, as it provides useful insights into the future of the vetting system in Kosovo.
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Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.
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vii.

Draft Law on Protection of Classified Information
Pursuant to Article 65 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the Assembly of

the Republic of Kosovo approved the Law on Protection of Classified Information72. The
purpose of this Law is to protect the interests of the Republic of Kosovo by improving the
system for protection of classified information. In order to establish a unique system which is
completely free of biases and/or any subjectivity, this draft law establishes a new Intelligence
Agency, namely the Agency for Protection of Classified Information (APCI), whereby carefully
highlighting its role, mission, functioning, structure, duties and responsibilities.
The agency shall be established as a national security agency which will serve to all the
public institutions of the Republic of Kosovo and their contractors related. APCI is to be a
central authority located in Prishtina with a fully professional, politically impartial, nonjudgmental, and law-abiding personnel. Regarding the transitional and final provisions,
according to this law, the Verification Department together with the files it has access to, shall be
relocated to the new agency under the commencement of the procedures by the Director of APCI
in cooperation with the Director of the existing agency, KIA. Whereas, current personnel of the
former agency KIA will have the opportunity to voluntarily choose through a declaration
whether they want to work for the APCI or to remain within the former agency’s structuresKIA. As per the assets of the KIA, the law highlights that the Directors of the two agencies,
namely that of ACPI and of KIA will have to agree with one another so as to use the KIA’s
assets until the completion of ACPI staff.
Finally, upon entry into force of the Law on Protection of Classified Data, any term KIA
that is used in the context of the Vetting Authority in any provisions of the laws and sub-legal
acts, shall be replaced with the new term APCI.
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Government of Kosovo, Office of the Prime Minister. “Draft Law on Protection of Classified Information” (2018).
Available at http://konsultimet.rks-gov.net/viewConsult.php?ConsultationID=40477
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III.

Methodology
This investigation is based on the findings and the extensive research conducted in the

period over one year 2018-2019. Due to its secretive nature, the research on the security and the
intelligence sector, more specifically, on the security vetting was challenging due to several
obstacles. Besides the informative documents posted by the KCSS that provided extensive
research on the topic of security vetting in Kosovo, as well as the CRDP publication that focuses
mainly on secondary data, the field of vetting in Kosovo remains largely unexplored.
Driven by this fact, I found it interesting to challenge myself with the topic of security
clearances. Even though the research process resulted to be much more challenging than initially
predicted, this paper aims to bring to light a comprehensive understanding of the vetting system
in Kosovo. The methodology used to gather information for this project is separated in two main
categories. The first one is focused extensively on desk research and literature review mainly
based on publications from KCSS and CRDP. Whereas, the second phase of research explores
the current vetting practices and personal perceptions of both the insiders of the vetting system
and the individuals subject to security vetting using small-scale surveys and semi-structured
interviews.
a. Secondary Data Collection
This phase of the investigation involved the process of researching the existing literature
and studies on security vetting in Kosovo. Keeping in mind that the vetting system is a very
sensitive topic to be explored, the information available on the ground was neither sufficient nor
satisfactory. To achieve the intended results, I mainly focused on two most relevant documents
“Security Vetting: A short policies document”, and “Kosovo’s Vetting System: A Case for
Further Reform”, published by the Kosovar Center for the Security Studies and Center for
Research, Documentation, and Publication, respectively. To get a better view of the vetting
system and the context of security clearances, I also consulted experts from both local and
international universities and organizations who have dealt with such practices. The webpage of
the government of the Republic of Kosovo was a useful source to retrieve information on
necessary laws and publications- needed for the purpose of this research.
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b. Primary Data Collection
Part 1: Semi-structured interviews
I have completed an extensive qualitative analysis on the ground by conducting 12 semistructured interviews with scholars who have done work on Kosovo’s security sector or are
members of the public institutions who either conduct security oversight or are subjects of
classified information. Due to anonymity principle of conducting research more detailed
information about the interviewees nor the institutions they represent is not disclosed. The
process of reaching the individuals at steak was very lengthy and stressful because of their
unwillingness to disclose relevant information. The interview requests were sent via email to 22
different individuals and institutions, however, only 5 of them responded and became part of the
sample. Ten of the interviews were conducted in-person, whereas only two were conducted via
email. The interviews were scheduled across 2 months due to the difficulties in reaching the
interviewees. Each interviewee was provided a consent form, while the permission to record the
interview was obtained only from five of the interviewees. The interviews were structured so as
to get insights into various aspects of the security vetting in Kosovo, its challenges and
opportunities, the Laws in force and the required amendments, the activities of the current
Intelligence Agency, and the draft law on Protection of Classified Information.
Part 2: Surveys
This research phase consisted of surveys designed to measure the familiarity of the
respondents with the security vetting system in Kosovo, the laws regulating this activity and the
agency who conducts the vetting, namely KIA. Security clearance remains a very sensitive topic
to be discussed especially in a developing country like Kosovo where a considerable portion of
the population remains unemployed and uneducated, and thus uninformed about such topics.
With that in mind, the sample could not involve many respondents, in contrast, it was only
focused towards a certain group of individuals who were in the position to give answer to the
sample questions; hence, a snowball sampling technique was used. The sample targeted Civil
Society representatives, government representatives, members of the Parliament, Representatives
of key security institutions (KP, KSF, and KIA), and independent experts. Considering the fact
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that the survey was targeted only to a limited number of respondents with specific backgrounds,
the surveys were distributed both via email and in-person. The sample was distributed across
different genders, age groups, and backgrounds, however, one thing they share in common is that
all of them have at least a bachelor’s degree. The sample was purposely targeted to individuals
with higher level of education so as to generate data regarding their familiarity with the topic, as
well as their opinions regarding the recommendations and reforms needed to alter the existing
condition of the vetting system in Kosovo.
c. Limitations
Due to the secretive nature of this paper, the research on security vetting in Kosovo faces
several obstacles such as unavailability or lack of access to relevant documents, unwillingness of
members of the public institutions to cooperate and disclose any information for the purpose of
this research, and inaccuracy of information received by the interviewees. The topic restricted
targeting larger groups of the population, therefore making the research process even more
challenging. The unresponsiveness of officials from different institutions (e.g. government,
security institutions, independent organizations and researchers), as well as their unwillingness to
participate in this project can also be highlighted as a limitation for gaining the most accurate
results. However, considering the lack of data on the topic up to date, 12 interview participants
and 37 survey respondents, all being individually targeted and having relevant knowledge to the
topic, indicate that this paper might serve as a good reference and basis for further investigation.
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IV.

Results and Analysis

1. Secondary Data
According to the Kosovo Security Barometer which measures the trust of Kosovo
citizens towards the country’s main security institutions, namely the Kosovo Police (KP), the
Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), the KIA has been
ranked as the least trusted security institution73. Not only is KIA the least trusted institution, but
the barometer has shown a constant decrease of the citizens trust from one year to another, so,
while in the year 2017 there was a percentage as high as 37 of people who trusted KIA, it has
significantly decreased to only 20% citizens who trust KIA in the year 2018, a fact which
furthermore illustrates citizens’ dissatisfaction with the existing agency74. To this end, I have
provided a chart which graphically shows the results of the KCSS Barometer.

Citizens' trust towards KIA (2018)
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Figure 4. Citizens’ trust towards KIA (Kosovo Security Barometer: Seventh Edition

73
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As it could be inferred throughout the literature review of this research paper, the security
vetting system in Kosovo is highly, if not, solely dependent on the Law on Classified
Information and Security Clearance and the activities of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency.
Undoubtedly, the law in practice together with the activities of the agency over years have not
contributed towards the betterment of the security vetting system in any sense. As such, the Law
on Classified Information and Security Clearance needs to be amended in order for the
Department of Classified Information to depart from the authority and structure of KIA.
According to the documents published by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies and the Center
for Research, Publication and Development, a completely new law or the amendment of the
current law would bring two significant changes: (1) improve the oversight of the security sector
and (2) foster the democratic governance. One unquestionable result would be the removal of the
conflict of interest between the intelligence agency and parliamentary committee.
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2. Primary Data
I.

In-depth Interviews

In order to get a comprehensive view of the most prevalent issues present in the security vetting
system in Kosovo, I have classified the findings from the in-depth interviews into four areas,
namely institutional, procedural, legal, and political flaws:

Institutional Flaws
The majority of the interviewees pointed out the fact that KIA presides over the vetting
authority of Kosovo. They furthermore criticized this arrangement by stating that KIA is not in
the position to exercise this authority, thus, jeopardizing the vetting system. The interviewees
viewed KIA’s ‘secretiveness’ as one of the most concerning issues regarding the security sector.
While they were aware of the fact that secretiveness if a prerogative of every intelligence agency,
they claimed that allowing a certain degree of
accessibility would be crucial for effective
public oversight. This scenario, however, is
inexistent in KIA considering the fact that there
is no accessibility whatsoever. The KIA does not
have an informative website nor an effective
complaint mechanism. As such, information
regarding highly relevant topics to Kosovo’s
security can only be received from legal

“It is easier to reach
someone in a rocket
space in NASA rather
than an employee of the
Kosovo Intelligence
Agency”
- Interviewee 2

regulations. Throughout this research process, it
was also proven that getting hold of the KIA employees is a very difficult task; access was
possible only through contacts e.g. phone calls or emails which were left unanswered the first
time.
One other important point that was raised by 6 interviewees was that the activities of KIA
can be closely related with terms of nepotism and clientelism. They shed light to the past
practices of the agency (e.g. vetting holdouts for political revenge) which were made public by
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the media, discrediting not only the members of the KIA but the whole security vetting
procedure.

Legal Flaws
As previously disclosed in this paper, under the current law, the vetting regulations pose a
conflict of interest. In other words, there is a large room for misuse of power when the vetting
authority is installed in an institution such as KIA that is horizontally equal to the other
institutions. For instance, an illustrative example of this conflict is the vetting of the members of
the Parliamentary Oversight Committee on KIA (POC). In order to carry out their duties, MAs
must be equipped with security clearances, however, in
reality, it remains at the KIA’s discretion to issue them

“Security Clearances
are the foundation
of a country’s
Security Sector”
-

Interviewee 3

the certificate or not. This scenario, as previously
highlighted, leads to a subordination of a legislative
body to an executive body, thus, disentitling the
executive body of its oversight power. Some of the
interviewees who have been familiar with the topic
provided some interesting insights into the matter by
bringing to fore the case of security clearances of the
POC, which had to be officially requested by the head

of the entity. However, the KIA’s superior position made the process undemocratic, thus, making
the security clearances of members of POC worthless. Resultantly, none of the members of the
POC has been vetted and therefore none of them was able to access confidential data crucial to
their oversight job.
The same conflict was seen in the case of vetting of
judges. The KIA is empowered to conduct vetting for
judges, whose task is to sue any of the KIA members in
case of misconduct. This fact once more points out to legal
flaws as KIA is given authority over the judicial branch.

“It is an unreliable
system with
practice of no
trust”
-

Interviewee 6

The interviewees state that the POC has very little if no
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access to relevant information of KIA, thus, the cooperation between the POC and KIA rather
than being a matter of course regulated by the laws in force, remains solely dependent on
individual groupings.

Procedural Flaws
Weak enforceability of law that leads to procedural flaws was one of the other findings
revealed by the interviewees. One of the reasons that the law remains poorly implemented is that
certain institutions of the country refuse to accept the fact that KIA is responsible for conducting
the vetting authority, hereby, refusing to accept the agency’s results. Two of the interviewees
stated “Among the institutions who adhere to the law are the Ministry of Justice and the National
Security Council”, while the others refuse to do so. Employees that are denied their security
clearance make use of their right to appeal against a failed vetting process. As introduced in the
literature review of this document, the appeals should be submitted to the court. However, the
majority of the appeals remain unprocessed due to the overload of courts with cases. As such,
many of the individuals who fail the vetting test refuse
to leave their positions waiting for their appeals to be
processed by the court. The overload of court
fundamentally affects the vetting system and puts more
pressure to the POC since all the complaints become
directed to them. Considering the fact that members of
the POC do not have security clearances or insights
over the criteria used by the KIA, the law does not

“It should be stated
in the law how to
defend the
principles of security
clearance
procedures”
- Interviewee 4

allow the POC to process the appeals. The majority of
the interviewees support the claim that that the
appealing system is dysfunctional. Some even stated that it would not be wrong to assume that
there is no vetting system in Kosovo at all.

kosovo.rit.edu

Page 36 of 61

RIT Kosovo (A.U.K)
Germia Campus Nazim Gafurri, 21 Dr. Shpëtim Robaj,
Prishtinë 10000, Republic of Kosovo

Political Flaws
Lack of trust and lack of cooperation between institutions

“A professional
vetting system is
one which is
depoliticized”
-

Interviewee 7

in Kosovo creates a hazardous environment in which
establishing a functional vetting system becomes
impossible. Even though these problems were present
before the vetting system was introduced, the current
security clearance regulations provides potential for
further distrust. The distrust comes as a result of the
power distribution between the vetting authority (KIA)
and its oversight bodies. Misuse of vetting creates an

atmosphere where individuals and institutions no longer believe in the integrity of the vetting
authority nor in the validity of the vetting results.
One of the interviewees pointed out the fact that
the consequences of vetting misuse may have
direct effects on the whole state-building
process. The past scandals of the KIA, namely
blackmailing and clientelist practices were
continually brought up throughout the interview
process by many of the participants. Even though
these practices happened in the past, and the
people affiliated with such scandals have been

“Security clearances
should not be
considered as
imposition but rather
as a tool to achieve
cooperation,
transparency, integrity
and accountability.”
-

Interviewee 11

discharged of their positions, the interviewees
remarked that the consequences and the culture
of distrust can still be felt.
Another point made by the interviewees was that aggravated relationship between the
KIA and other security institutions, namely KP and KSF is detrimental to effective vetting
system.
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II.

Surveys

The findings of the quantitative part of this research project, which takes the form of a
survey conducted with individuals from different profiles relevant to the topic, provide helpful
insights into the role of the security vetting system through the respondents’ lenses. The survey
findings mainly complement the points made in the part of qualitative research and the results of
the secondary data so as to get a clearer picture of the main challenges that the vetting system in
Kosovo faces. The findings that emerged from this investigation are broken down an analyzed in
the section below.
1. Demographic Analysis of the Results
The respondents had to be 18+ years and with prior knowledge to the topic. As illustrated
in figure 5 the sample was not
very diverse with regard to age;

AGE
18-24

only 2% belonged to 18-24 age

25-39

40-60

Above 61

11% 2%

group, 47% were 25-39 years
old, 40% were 40-60 years of

47%

age, and the additional 11%
40%

were above 61 years.
Figure 5. Age of respondents

That the majority would fall between the age of 25-39 and 40-60 was rather expected
considering the fact that the respondents were selected based on their knowledge to the topic and
their working positions held, an indicator that they had to be of middle age.
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The level of education of the respondents of the survey is highly important to our analysis
considering the quality of information required. Since we are dealing with a topic of secretive

LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Primary Education

Secondary Education

Graduate

Doctorate

Undergraduate

nature, respondents were
expected to have finished at least
their undergraduate studies. As
the graph shows, none of the

5% 0%6%

respondents have finished only

2%

their primary education, 2% of
the respondents have finished
87%

their primary and secondary
education, 6% of the respondents

Figure 6. Level of Education

have finished their primary,

secondary, and undergraduate studies, 87% of the respondents have finished their primary,
secondary, undergraduate, and graduate studies, whereas only 5% have finished their doctorate
studies in addition to the others. The largest group of the sample falls within the “graduate
studies” category, meaning that their information regarding the topic is to be taken in account
and to serve as a means for bringing in different insights.

Profession: The professions of the respondents varied showing their different professional
background, such as: Professor, Researcher, Lecturer of Legal and Political Subjects, Lecturer of
International Relations subjects, Police Investigative Officer, Strategy and Doctrine Officer,
Security and Intelligence Analyst, Sector Coordinator for Public Opinion Research, Security
Expert, Director, Prosecutor.
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2. Respondents’ opinion regarding the effectiveness of security vetting in Kosovo
The outcomes generated from this question generally matched the results presented in the
literature review of this paper, meaning that the people’s opinion regarding Kosovo’s security
system effectiveness have not drastically changed over years, in contrast, their concern regarding
this sector continues to be relatively high. When asked whether they agree with the following
statement “Kosovo has an effective security vetting system”, only 10% agreed with the statement
as opposed to 47% and 22% of the respondents who respectively, “don’t agree” and “strongly
disagree” with this statement.

Figure 7. Respondents’
opinion regarding the
effectiveness of security
vetting in Kosovo

DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENT: "KOSOVO HAS AN
EFFECTIVE SECURITY VETTING SYSTEM"
Fully agree

Agree

No opinion

Don’t agree

I strongly disagree

0%

Statistically speaking,

22%

there is a general

10%
21%

dissatisfaction of the
people who are familiar
with the system. A

47%

percentage as high as 47 of the people who strongly disagree with the system’s effectiveness in
Kosovo leaves room for many interpretations. As highlighted earlier throughout this project, lack
of trust in institutions, lack of cooperation between security entities, and the accumulation of
cases of misconduct of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency have all devaluated the vetting process.
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1. Respondents’ opinion regarding the role of the intelligent service
By analyzing the people’s opinion regarding the intelligence services both in the past and
present, I tried to come up with the relationship that the system and the agency have with one
another. As the graph below shows, the majority of the respondents believe that the former role
of intelligent services served the interest of political groups, indicating that the party who
controlled the intelligent

THE FORMER ROLE OF THE KOSOVO
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SERVED THE
INTEREST OF POLITICAL GROUPS
Fully agree

Agree

No opinion
12%

Don’t agree

Strongly disagree

service controlled the whole
vetting system. This result is
also supported by the material
presented in the literature

4%

review section of this project as
well as the results of the
53%

interviews presented in the

31%

primary data section.
Figure 8. Respondents’ opinion
regarding the role of the intelligent service.

While 4% of the respondents did not agree that the former role of the intelligent services served
the interest of political groups, 12% had no opinion on the matter. In contrast, there was a high
share of people who agreed and fully agreed to the statement (31% and 53%, respectively), an
indicator that intelligence services were involved in clientelist practices which have indeed

TODAY, THE SCOPE OF INTELLIGENT
SERVICE IN KOSOVO IS BASED SOLELY
ON THE LAW

Fully agree

Agree

No opinion

Don’t agree

5%

The next question focused on

present, aiming to get a better
13%

kosovo.rit.edu

system in Kosovo.

the role of the KIA in the
9%

27%

46%

Strongly disagree

hindered the role of the vetting

view of the respondents’
Figure 8.1. Respondents’ opinion
regarding the role of the intelligent
service
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opinion regarding agency’s adherence to the law. The results gathered from this question
supported the arguments presented on the secondary data section of this project as both scholars
and the respondents believe that the activities of the KIA are not solely based on the law. As the
graph above shows, only 5% of the respondents fully agreed that the scope of the intelligence
service in Kosovo is based solely on the law, while 9% agreed, 13% did not have an opinion on
the matter, 46% did not agree, and 27% strongly disagreed. These results serve as an indicator
that even though the activities of the KIA are regulated by the law, law inconsistencies continue
to prevail.

What makes a successful and a trustworthy Intelligence
Service in a democratic country?

.

Intelligence Service Methodology

51.0%

Democratic Control

55.1%

Technical and Technological Equipment

40.8%

Geopolitical Interests
Financial Aspects
Strategic Orientation of National Policies
International Cooperation

36.7%
20.4%
49.0%
53.1%

Figure 9. Determinants of a successful and trustworthy Intelligence Service

Having generated information regarding the current vetting system in Kosovo, the role of the
intelligence agency in the past, and the law inconsistencies seen in the present, I will now
explore the respondent’s view on what makes a successful and trustworthy Intelligence Service
in a democratic country. The next question, different from the others, aims to provide some
helpful recommendations on the topic rather than explain what the current situation of the vetting
system is. The respondents were asked to choose one or more options that they believe make a
successful and trustworthy Intelligence Service in a democratic country like Kosovo. As shown
kosovo.rit.edu
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in Figure 9, Democratic Control, the Intelligence Service Methodology, and the International
Cooperation are three most important determinants of a successful intelligence agency according
to our survey.
1. Respondents’ opinion regarding security clearances
This section of the results will explore the familiarity of the respondents with security clearances,
their experience with such practices, and their opinion regarding KIA’s performance in this
matter. Considering that this survey targeted individuals with relevant positions and prior
knowledge to the topic, it is expected that the majority of the respondents would be familiar with
the term “security

ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE TERM
"SECURITY CLEARANCES"?

clearances”. The
following question

Yes

asked the respondents

No

8%

whether they have ever
requested security
clearance. The results
showed that 68% of the
respondents were in job

92%

positions that required
Figure 10. Respondents’ opinion regarding security clearances

access to classified information of different levels, whereas the remaining 38% have not. The

HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE
VETTING PROCEDURE CONDUCTED BY
THE KIA?

Very satisfied

Satisfied

OK

Not satisfied

who have requested
security clearance
certificates is quite

8%
11%

28%

Very dissatisfied

number of respondents

important since it leads us
to the other question of the

21%

survey. The number of
respondents who answered

32%

Figure 11.
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yes to this question were quite satisfactory since the survey tried to reveal more information of
the process of security clearances. The following question asked those respondents who
have requested access to classified information whether they have been issued or denied their
certificates. The results of these questions showed that 76% of the participants were issued the
security clearances certificate while the remaining 24% were not. Lastly, the respondents were
asked about their satisfaction regarding the vetting procedure conducted by the KIA. While 8%
answered to be very satisfied with the vetting process conducted by the KIA, 11% were satisfied,
21% were OK, 32% were dissatisfied, and the remaining 28% were very dissatisfied. These
results suggest that regardless of the fact that the majority of the respondents, specifically 76%
were issued their security clearance certificates, their satisfaction regarding the vetting procedure
remained relatively low. The results revealed from the small-scale survey generally matched the
scholars’ view on the topic who have highlighted that the vetting procedure of KIA is very
untrustworthy and biased, hence, unsatisfactory.
2. Respondents’ opinion regarding the Draft Law on Protection of the classified information
and the Agency for Protection of Classified Information (APCI)
This section analyzes respondents’ opinion on the draft law on protection of the classified
information and the new intelligence agency that is to be established under this law. As
previously disclosed in the literature review section of this project, the purpose of this draft law
is to protect the interests of the

ARE YOU AWARE OF THE DRAFT LAW
ON PROTECTION OF THE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION?

Republic of Kosovo by
establishing a well-functioning
agency which will resultantly

Yes

No

I have heard of it but I am not familiar
13%

bring a free-biased vetting
system. To explore whether the
respondents shared the same

16%

opinion regarding the benefits
71%

that this draft law will bring, I
have posed two questions.

Figure 12.
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The first question, as illustrated in figure 12, asked the respondents how the establishment of the
agency for protection of classifies information (APCI) would affect the security vetting system
on its totality.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AGENCY FOR
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (APCI):
Will positively affect the security vetting system

Will not affect the existing security vetting system

Will negatively affect the security vetting system

I have no opinion on this matter

24%
39%
6%

31%

Figure 13.

The results of the second question, as illustrated in the graph above, showed that respondents are
quite reluctant regarding any improvements this agency could bring. While 39% believed that
establishing APCI would positively affect the security vetting system in Kosovo, 6% believed
the opposite, 31% believed that no changes to the current condition would be brought, whereas
the remaining 24% did not want to share their opinions on this matter. The percentage of
respondents who believed that the agency would not affect the existing security vetting system,
more specifically, 31, is quite worrying in the sense that people have lost faith in transparency
and effectiveness of intelligence services in Kosovo mainly due to past clientelist practices of the
former agency.
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V.

Summary of Findings
Having introduced the results generated from the conducted interviews and surveys, this

section pinpoint some of the most important findings that help us summarize the challenges of
the security vetting system in Kosovo. The reasons why there are inadequacies in vetting are tied
to bigger concepts such as weak law enforcement, corruption, weak cooperation between
security institutions, and general misconceptions about the role and function of security
clearances. The following are primary source findings which support the data presented in the
literature review section of this project.


The findings suggest that the current vetting system is characterized with poor law
implementation, dysfunctional appealing system, and weak oversight.



All interviewees and respondents agree that there is an immediate need to reform the current
vetting system.



The majority of the interviewees and survey respondents’ believe that a legal reform would
contribute towards an effective and transparent vetting system.



Many of our interviewees and survey respondents’ indicated a need for legal reform that
would lead towards a more regulated and trustful vetting system.



Findings shed light to the idea that the law on security clearances remains dysfunctional
mainly due to the reason that the law was based on models that operate in other contexts
dissimilar to that of Kosovo.



The majority of the interviewees agreed with the claim that effective security vetting has
many positive aspects on the state-building process.



The majority of the interviewees believe that an efficient vetting system can largely relieve
the judicial sector, while six others do not see any positive relationship between vetting
system and the judiciary.
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VI.

Recommendations
Regardless of the fact that Kosovo is dealing with a new system of verification, this paper

discloses that the system is greatly challenged due to political implications and the clannish
and/or individual decisions to issue or deny the security clearance for police body, intelligence
personnel and civil servants. As such, the system needs improvements in the following areas:
Short Term Goals:


Strengthen the Parliamentary Oversight

Transparency and accountability are the fundamentals of a democratic government, as such, the
primary responsibility falls completely on the shoulders of parliament. Considering that the
system of security vetting in Kosovo lacks adequate parliamentary oversight, the measurements
to be taken towards improving the current condition must start with the strengthening of the
parliamentary oversight.


Ensure a system of checks and balances between the security institutions

To prevent the concentration of authorization within one security entity, there should be check
and balances between all the security institutions in Kosovo. The concentration of power and
authority in the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (an institution horizontally equal with the other
security institutions) has become one of the main topic discussions in the security sector. KIA’s
responsibility as an executive body makes it a “super-institution”, disfavoring furthermore the
other security institution and hindering the vetting process. To avoid this from happening, a new
system of checks and balances must be introduced so that all the security institutions have the
same authority over one another.


Restructure the appealing system

As highlighted in this research study, one of the drawbacks of the current system of security
clearances is the appealing system. Not only is there a backload of cases of people who have
been denied their security clearance certificates, but there are many more who have appealed to
the agency’s decision regarding the denial of their certificates. As pinpointed in the literature
review section, one of the major debates between two security institutions namely KIA and KP,
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has revolved around the denial of security clearances of numerous police officers. The appealing
system for the cases of the Police personnel was not in accordance with the Law on Classified
Information and Security Clearances but rather served the interest of the KIA. As appealing
system is crucial to establishing a reliable and accountable security vetting system, restructuring
it is a necessity.


Awareness raising on the importance of vetting

As it was continually stated throughout this project, conducting research on the field of security
vetting was a difficult challenge mainly due to the nature of the topic and the unfamiliarity of
citizens with the topic. Had the population been more aware of the activities of the Intelligence
Agency and the vetting system as a whole, the surveys could disclose much more accurate data
and therefore provide much helpful insights into the topic of security clearances. Educating civil
society, public officials and other staff about the purpose and benefits of vetting would ensure a
more trustworthy process.
Along with the goals that can be achieved in the short term, institutions should also address long
term goals as listed below:
Long Term Goals:


Restructure of personnel



Independent Expertise



Reduce political and personal influence



International Cooperation



Creation of a political and institutional culture
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VII. Conclusion
The aim of this Honors Project was to provide insights into the current condition of
Kosovo’s vetting system, highlight its drawbacks, and provide recommendations on how to
overcome them. The results of primary and secondary data confirmed that while security vetting
system in Kosovo has been recently established, it remains greatly challenged by political
implications and the clannish and/or individual decisions to issue or to deny security clearance
certificates. This study reveals that Kosovo’s current system of security vetting requires
immediate reform in several aspects.
The literature review section of this project provided a comprehensive view on the topic
by explaining in detail the current vetting system in Kosovo, the process of security clearances,
as well as the agency who exercises vetting authority. Next, two main laws regulating the vetting
system in Kosovo: Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and Security
Clearances and Law No. 03/L-063 2008 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency provided the
framework for analyzing current condition and potential challenges of the system. Next, three
problems with regards to supervision of legality were identified. And finally, the literature
review presented the Draft Law on Protection of Classified Information according to which the
new intelligence agency is to be established. This section provided necessary information to help
the readers understand the obstacles that the verification of security system is facing.
The analysis of the secondary data suggested that (1) Citizens’ trust towards the Kosovo
Intelligence Agency has been decreasing over years; (2) There is an immediate need for reform
on the vetting process in Kosovo; (3) A law amendment could improve the oversight of the
security sector as well as foster democratic governance, and (4) A new legal framework would
remove the conflict of interest between the intelligence agency and parliamentary committee.
Findings from the semi-structured in-depth interviews held with 12 different participants
were grouped into four main categories: institutional, political, legal, and procedural flaws.
Whereas, findings of the quantitative part of this research project, namely surveys conducted
with 37 individuals from different profiles relevant to the topic were grouped into five
categories: (1) Demographics, (2) Respondents’ opinion regarding the effectiveness of security
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vetting in Kosovo, (3) Respondents’ opinion regarding the role of the intelligent service, (4)
Respondents’ opinion regarding security clearances, and (5) Respondents’ opinion regarding the
Draft Law on Protection of the classified information and the Agency for Protection of Classified
Information (APCI). Interview and survey results came up with a helpful conclusion which
suggests that the current vetting system in Kosovo is characterized with poor law
implementation, dysfunctional appealing system, and weak oversight.
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IX.

Appendices

A. Graphs and Charts

GENDER
Males

Females

16%

84%

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MONITORING THE
DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONING OF INTELLIGENT
SERVICES IS VERY IMPORTANT
Fully agree

Agree

No opinion

Don’t agree

Totally disagree

14%

37%
14%

8%

27%
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KOSOVO'S LEGAL BASIS IS IN HARMONIZATION WITH
LEGISLATION OF THE EU REQUIRED FOR WELLFUNCTIONING OF SECURITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES
OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.
I fully agree

I agree

I don’t have an opinion

11%

I disagree

I strongly disagree

7%
14%

17%
51%

KIA’S ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE LAW NO.03/L –178 ON CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION AND SECURITY CLEARANCES
Yes

No

Only partly

17%

41%

42%
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HAVE YOU EVER REQUESTED A SECURITY CLEARANCE?
Yes

No

Yes
32%

No
68%

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ISSUED OR DENIED A SECURITY
CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE?
I have been issued the security clearance certificate
I have been denied the security clearance certificate

24%

76%
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B. Consent Form
Informed Consent Form for Social Science Research
RIT Kosovo
Title of Project:
Principal Investigator: Rita Ejupi, RIT Kosovo student
21, Sejdi Kryeziu, Prishtine
045-344-001; ritae@auk.org

1.

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research study is to explore the challenges and
opportunities of the security vetting system in Kosovo.

2.

Procedures to be followed: You will be asked to answer 11 questions during this interview.

3.

Duration: It will take about 25 minutes to complete the interview.

4. Statement of Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is confidential. The data will be
used only for qualitative insights into the usage of social media marketing among Kosovar businesses.

5.

Voluntary Participation: Your decision to be in this research is voluntary. You can stop at any
time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer.

You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. If you agree to take part in this
research study and the information outlined above, please sign your name and indicate the date below.

You will be given a copy of this form for your records.
______________________________________________ _____________________
Participant Signature Date
______________________________________________ _____________________
Person Obtaining Consent Date
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C. Interview Questions

1. In what ways do you believe that effective vetting can have positive effects in state building
processes?

2. Do you believe that our institutions are aware of the vetting system and its law in Kosovo?

3. Do you believe that efficient vetting system can relieve the judicial sector? If yes, in what sense?

4. Do you believe that KP and KSF contribute to jeopardizing the vetting system considering that these
institutions don’t have good relations with one another?
5. Do you view KIA’s secretiveness as an obstacle for effective public oversight?

6. What is your opinion regarding the appealing system?

7. Do you see legal inconsistencies that lead to oversight obstacles?

8. At which point of the current vetting system do you see the greatest reform need?

9. Do you believe that KIA should no longer have vetting authority?
10. Do you believe that the new body should be incorporated into another body e.g. the Prime Minister’s
office or that it should be administratively and politically independent?

11. What challenges do you see in regard to the acceptance of vetting as part of a broader Transitional
Justice strategy?
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D. Survey Questions
1. What is your age?
a) 18-24
b) 25-39
c) 40-60
d) Above 61
2. What is your gender?
a) Male
b) Female
3. What is your highest level of education?
a) Primary Education
b) Secondary Education
c) Undergraduate
d) Graduate
e) Doctorate
4. What is your profession?
Please enter your answer
5. Kosovo’s legal basis is in harmonization with legislation of the European Union required for
the functioning of security policies and practices of intelligence services
a) I fully agree
b) I agree
c) I don’t have an opinion
d) I disagree
e) I strongly disagree
6. Do you agree with the following statement: “Kosovo has an effective security vetting
system”.
a) I fully agree
b) I agree
c) I don’t have an opinion
d) I don’t agree
e) I strongly disagree
7. The former role of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency served the interest of political groups
a) I fully agree
b) I agree
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c) I don’t have an opinion
d) I don’t agree
e) I strongly disagree

8. Today, the scope of intelligent service in Kosovo is based solely on the law
f) I fully agree
g) I agree
h) I don’t have an opinion
i) I don’t agree
j) I strongly disagree
9. The role of Civil Society in monitoring the democratic functioning of Intelligent Services is
very important
a) I fully agree
b) I agree
c) I don’t have an opinion
d) I don’t agree
e) I strongly disagree
10. What makes a successful and a trustworthy Intelligence Service in a democratic country?
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

Intelligent Service Methodology
Democratic Control
Technical and Technological Equipment
Geopolitical Interests
Financial Aspects
Strategic Orientation of National Security Policies
International Cooperation

11. Are you familiar with the term Security Clearances?
a) Yes
b) No
12. Have you ever requested a security clearance?
a) Yes
b) No
13. Have you ever been issued or denied a security clearance?
a) Yes
b) No
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If yes, from 1 to 5 how satisfied are you with the vetting procedure conducted by the Kosovo Intelligence
Agency?
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Very Satisfied
Satisfied
OK
Unsatisfied
Unsatisfied

14. Do you believe that KIA’s activities have been in accordance with the Law No.03/L –178 on
Classification of Information and Security Clearances?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Only partly
15. Are you aware of the Draft Law on Protection of the Classified Information?
a) Yes
b) No
c) I have heard of it but I am not familiar

16. According to the Draft law on Protection of the Classified Information, the security vetting
authority shall pass from Kosovo Intelligence Agency to the newly established Agency for
Protection of Classified Information. The process will: (Question with more than one answer)
a) Improve the oversight of the security sector
b) Foster the democratic governance
c) Remove the conflict of interest between the intelligence agency and the parliamentary
oversight committee
d) Increase transparency of the vetting process
e) All of the above
17. The establishment of the Agency for Protection of Classified Information (APCI):
a)
b)
c)
d)

Will positively affect the security vetting system
Wil not affect the existing security vetting system
Will negatively affect the security vetting system
I have no opinion on this matter
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